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Divorce Records:
Linn County, Iowa, 1928-1944
GLENDA RILEY
DURING THE PAST DECADE, a growing interest in the his-
tory of divorce in the United States has encouraged research-
ers to begin retrieving information from dusty and faded
county divorce records. From these sources, historians and
social scientists have formulated suggestive theories about such
issues as shifting gender relations, rising expectations of mar-
riage, and the growth of companionate marriage.^
Clearly, divorce records are rich resources, but they are
also extremely difficult to interpret. At best, they reveal only
fragmentary reality regarding the people and the marriages
they represent. For a number of reasons, the true and complete
experiences, emotions, and motives of divorce-seekers often
remain more clouded than exposed by divorce records.
Divorce documents from Linn County, Iowa, between
1928 and 1944 reveal many of the difficulties, and sortie of the
I would like to thank the Henry E. Huntington Library in San Marino, Cali-
fornia, and the University of Northern Iowa for research support during
1988-89, and the staff of the Clerk of Courts Office, Civil Division, in Cedar
Rapids for its assistance.
l.See, for example, Nancy F. Cott, "Divorce and the Changing Status of
Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly
33 (1976), 586-614; idem, "Eighteenth-Century Family and Social Life
Revealed in Massachusetts Divorce Records," Journal of Social History 10
(1976), 20-43; Robert L. Griswold, "Apart but Not Adrift: Wives, Divorce,
and Independence in California, 1850-1890," Pacific Historical Review 49
(1980), 265-83; idem. Family and Divorce in California, 1850-1890 (Albany,
NY, 1982); Elaine Tyler May, Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-
Victorian America (Chicago, 1980); and idem, "In-Laws and Out-Laws:
Divorce in New Jersey, 1890-1925," in Mary R. Murrin, ed.. Women in New
Jersey History (Trenton, NJ, 1985), 31-41.
THE ANNALS OF IOWA 50 (Winter 1991). © The State Historical Society
of Iowa, 1991.
787
788 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
rewards, involved in studying such records. The records are
plentiful, for in spite of Iowa's bucolic image, created in part by
Grant Wood's paintings and the prairie novels of Bess Streeter
Aldrich and Hamlin Garland, many Iowans divorced. In 1930
the state's divorce rate ranked twenty-third in the nation. In
Linn County, 4,758 divorces were granted between 1928 and
1944. Of these, 3,796, or nearly 80 percent, went to women,
while 962, or slightly more than 20 percent, went to men.^
BASIC DETAILS of each Linn County divorce were recorded
in a register titled Record of Divorces, 1928-1944. The register
includes names, nationality, race, number of prior marriages,
date of marriage, grounds for divorce, date of divorce, and
whether alimony was awarded. From a researcher's viewpoint,
it is unfortunate that the divorce register omits numbers of chil-
dren involved and decisions concerning custodial parents. In
addition, child support awards are recorded only in marginal
notations. The register also neglects to specify which cases were
annulments rather than divorces. Annulments can be identified
only by the ground listed—consanguinity, impotence, bigamy,
insanity, or either party being under legal age at the time of
marriage.3
Further information concerning each couple listed in the
register can be found in a case file, which includes a divorce
petition, such court orders as writs of attachment and injunc-
tions, a transcript of the couple's divorce hearing, and a divorce
decree. These case files, which are not easily accessible to
researchers, have a number of deficiencies. In particular, case
2. State divorce rates are found in Alexander A. Plateris, One Hundred Years of
Marriage and Divorce Statistics: United States, 1867-1967 (Rockville, MD,
1973), 34-35. Numbers of Linn County divorces are from Record of Divorces,
1928-1944, Linn County, Iowa, Linn County Courthouse, Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
I hand-counted the figures. I chose the period 1928 to 1944 for what it might
reveal about changes in numbers of divorces during the depression years.
The data showed no significant rise or drop in divorces during those years,
but they did reveal the difficulties of analyzing divorce cases. For a descrip-
tion of Linn County and its major city. Cedar Rapids, see Ernie Danek, Tall
Corn and High Technology (Woodland Hill, CA, 1980).
3. Impotency was the most commonly cited cause for annulments. See, for
example. Cases #55321, 40958, and 48869, Record of Divorces. Names of liti-
gants have been omitted to protect the privacy of their families.
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file documents fail to record routinely the presence or absence
of children or child support awards. One wife received custody
of the couple's infant daughter, but no mention is made of child
support although she had specifically requested it. In another
case, the register indicated that child support had been
awarded, but case file documents give no indication that a sup-
port order existed.^
Another problem with Linn County case files is their fail-
ure to record the occupations of litigants except in an occasional
passing mention. In asking for custody of a seven-month-old
daughter and support for the child, one wife stated that her
husband worked at a starch factory in Cedar Rapids where he
earned five dollars per day. Another wife testified that her hus-
band earned $165 per month working as a railroad switchman,
and one that her husband worked for the Lock Joint Pipe Com-
pany in Kansas City. References to women's employment were
even more sparse, but occasionally a husband remarked that
his wife worked as a housekeeper or in another job. In other
cases, wives noted that they had been employed during the
marriage, but seldom specified their jobs.^
In addition to discrepancies and omissions, case files fre-
quently lack enough information for a reader to draw a reason-
able conclusion about certain cases. In one sketchy set of
records, a woman charged her husband with cruelty, but gave
no details or substantiating incidents from their six-year mar-
riage.* As a result, the occurrences that drove her toward the
divorce court are unknown. In a similar case, a husband peti-
tioned for divorce from his wife on the ground of cruelty, but
failed to offer substantiating examples. Yet on April 10, 1943,
only nineteen days before their twenty-seventh anniversary, he
received a divorce. Although his wife was the guilty party, the
court awarded her alimony of ten dollars per week and title to
4. Cases #39068 and 50739, Record of Divorces. Such variation in documents
and resulting interpretations often led to debates about whether divorce law
helped or hurt women. For such a debate, see Claude D. Stout, "The Legal
Status of Women in Wisconsin," Marquette Law Review 14 (February/June
1930), 155-65; and Julia B. Dolan, "Another Version of the Legal Status of
Women in Wisconsin," Marquette Law Review 15 (April 1931), 139-57.
5. Cases #39068, 37932, 41557, 42003, and 39124, Record of Divorces.
6. Case #42022, Record of Divorces.
790 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
their house and household goods. The records do not indicate
whether the husband offered this settlement, if the wife asked
for it, or if the judge initiated it.^
Case file documents also leave a good deal unexplained in
another far more intricate suit that eventually resulted in two
divorce decrees. The husband, who had been married four
previous times, and the wife, who had been married six pre-
vious times, had obtained a divorce on January 16,1940, on an
unspecified ground. They remarried on February 23, 1940. In
late 1940 the wife applied for a divorce, testifying that her hus-
band beat her, cursed her, and called her "all manner of vile
names." Her husband responded that she drank to excess, had
threatened to kill him, had thrown dishes at him, and had
'made a general nuisance of herself." The judge awarded the
wife a divorce and one fifty-dollar alimony payment. A few
days later, the former wife and husband were back in court ask-
ing to have the decree set aside. The husband then petitioned
for a divorce from his wife. On December 4, 1940, the same
judge ruled for the husband.» One can only guess whether this
was a case of a tempestuous relationship with numerous break-
ups and reconciliations, or one in which a vindictive husband
tricked his wife in order to save face and fifty dollars by getting
a divorce himself.
Clearly, it is difficult to draw accurate conclusions about
divorce petitions and decrees from such inconsistent, incom-
plete data. Answers to important questions concerning child
support and which occupational groups most frequently
divorced remain uncertain.
PEOPLE'S TRUE REASONS for divorcing their spouses are
likewise almost impossible to divine. Linn County divorce-
seekers had a choice of only six grounds during this period.
They chose the ground that most closely approximated their sit-
uations, was the least damaging to everyone concerned, or was
the most likely to persuade a judge to give them a divorce and a
favorable settlement. Consequently, their divorce petitions
7. Case #55585, Record of Divorces.
8. Case #52678, Record of Divorces.
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were legal documents rather than honest, complete stories
about their marriages.
The six grounds available to residents of Linn County were
well established and widely accepted because they had devel-
oped over nearly a century. When the United States Congress
created the district of Iowa as part of the Territory of Michigan
in 1834, Iowa fell under the jurisdiction of the Ordinance of
1787, which specified impotency, adultery, extreme cruelty,
and willful desertion for three years as grounds for divorce. In
1836 Iowa became part of the Territory of Wisconsin; then the
territorial legislature granted divorces.^
When Iowa became a territory in its own right in 1838,
legislators specified only impotency and adultery as grounds
for divorce. Iowa's Revised Statutes of 1842-43 listed eight
grounds for divorce: impotency, bigamy, adultery, desertion for
one year, conviction of a felony or infamous crime, habitual
drunkenness, cruel and barbarous treatment endangering the
life of spouse, and indignities rendering a spouse's situation
intolerable. In 1845 an amendment added a ninth cause—an
omnibus clause that permitted judges to grant divorces "when it
shall be made fully apparent to the satisfaction of the court,
that the parties cannot live in peace or happiness together, and
that their welfare requires a separation between them."!"
When Iowa achieved statehood in 1846, those provisions
remained in force. In 1851, however, the legislature reduced the
number of grounds to eight by deleting the indignities clause.
Four years later, a conservative legislature stipulated that only
adultery, conviction of a felony, impotency, and desertion for
three years were grounds for divorce. But in 1858 the legislature
restored all of the grounds listed in the 1851 Code except the
omnibus clause, and compromised on the desertion clause,
with desertion for two years being grounds for divorce. Legisla-
tors in subsequent years tinkered only slightly with the provi-
sions. The Code of 1873 included an amended list of grounds.
9. See Ruth A. Gallaher, Legal and Political Status of Women in Iowa (Iowa City,
1918), 17-21.
10.1839 Iowa Territorial Statutes 189-91; 1843 Iowa Territorial Revised Stat-
utes 238-39; 1841-42 Iowa Territorial Acts 87; 1845 Iowa Territorial Acts 23.
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adding prior pregnancy of a wife by a man other than her hus-
band, but omitting impotency and bigamy."
In 1928, then, Iowa had six grounds for divorce, five of
which were long-term and customary reasons: adultery, deser-
tion, conviction of a felony, habitual drunkenness, and cruel
and inhuman treatment.^^ Because the sixth ground—prior
pregnancy of a wife—was seldom used, Iowans essentially had
only five grounds available to them. Whatever conditions ter-
minated their marriages, petitioners had to fit them into the
rubric of these charges.
Linn County's divorce register for the years 1928 through
1944 indicates that petitioners' choices of grounds were similar
to the choices made by Americans nationwide. The majority of
Linn County litigants leaned toward broad, relatively non-
damning grounds, especially cruelty. In a randomly selected
sample of nine hundred cases from the divorce register, 85 per-
cent of petitioners pleaded cruelty; nearly 88 percent of women
used this charge, while nearly 78 percent of men did so." It is
likely that a number of divorcing couples colluded in choosing
this ground rather than harsher grounds, such as adultery or
alcoholism. Although collusion concerning grounds can sel-
dom be proven, the possibility of its existence demands that
records be read with a critical eye.
Cruelty had become an increasingly attractive ground over
the years because the Iowa Supreme Court had broadened its
definition. In 1871 the court had ruled that a wife who charged
her husband with cruelty could be granted a divorce only if his
actions threatened her physical well-being. "Mere turbulence of
temper, petulance of manner" did not count, nor did "every
11. Code of Iowa (1851) § 1482; 1854-55 Laws of Iowa 112; 1858 Laws of Iowa
97-98, 236; Code of Iowa (1873) §§ 2223-24; Annotated Code of Iowa (1897) §§
3174-75; Code of Iowa (Supp. 1913) §§ 3174-75. See also John E. Briggs, His-
tory of Social Legislation in Iowa (Iowa City, 1915), 89-90.
12. Isabel Drummond, Getting a Divorce (New York, 1931), 93-96. For an
overview of changing divorce law, see Lawrence M. Friedman, "Rights of Pas-
sage: Divorce Law in Historical Perspective," Oregon Law Review 63 (1984),
649-69; Max Rheinstein, Marriage Stability, Divorce, and the Law (Chicago,
1972); and Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western
Society (Cambridge, 1988).
13. The sample of nine hundred cases, which I hand-counted, was derived
from Record of Divorces.
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slight touching of the wife by the husband, even in anger" con-
stitute grounds for a divorce. But in 1889 the Supreme Court
reversed the earlier decision, declaring that "cruel or inhuman
treatment" need not be physical; even repeated statements by
the husband that the wife was unchaste could justify divorce on
the ground of cruelty because his words could create a detri-
mental mental state that was damaging to her health.'''
One petitioner who took advantage of the enlarged con-
struction of cruelty was a man who sued his wife for divorce in
1928. He charged cruelty because she had falsely assured him
that she had sufficient funds to convert the top floor of his
house into a rental unit. He married her, engaged plumbers and
others to do the necessary renovations, and presented the bills
to her. She stalled by saying that she preferred to withdraw her
funds after the end of the current interest period. Eventually,
she admitted that she had lied about having capital to invest in
the house. She then refused to cosign a bank loan to pay the
bills. A subsequent divorce decree ensured that his house
would be free from any claims by her.'^
The second most popular ground was desertion. Of the
sample of nine hundred cases, 10 percent of Linn County peti-
tioners claimed desertion; 8 percent of women and nearly 19
percent of men did so. In one desertion case, a woman sued her
husband for divorce in 1930, seven years after he had deserted
her and their two children. The documents fail to disclose either
her reasons for waiting so long to obtain a divorce or the judge's
reasons for ruling that she could remarry immediately rather
than fulfilling the one-year waiting period required by Iowa
law. The woman probably had recently become romantically
involved. Marriage would give her children a home, a high pri-
ority for most judges who often allowed immediate remarriage
in such cases. A curious case of desertion involved the mother
of a ten-year-old boy who accused her husband of refusing to
14. Many cruelty decisions are reviewed in Code of Iowa (Supp. 1913) § 3174.
See also Gallaher, Legal and Political Status of Women, 67-68. A similar trend
occurred in other parts of the country as well. See, for example, Jane Turner
Censer, "'Smiling Through Her Tears': Ante-Bellum Southern Women and
Divorce," American Journal of Legal History 25 (January 1981), 24-47.
15. Case #38441, Record of Divorces.
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supply her with "sufficient necessaries and comforts," being
habitually drunk, and, by his behavior, forcing her to leave him.
Because he had never asked her to return, she argued that "such
conduct on his part amounted to legal desertion." The court
apparently agreed, for it granted the divorce.^*
Only slightly more than one percent of the sampled Linn
County petitioners used the ground of conviction of a felony;
1.5 percent of women and 0.5 percent of men used this charge.
Felony cases tended to be cut-and-dried, probably because the
evidence of a spouse's incarceration was indisputable. One
wife with three young children under the age of three testified
that her husband was in an Iowa reformatory because he had
committed an unnamed felony. She requested custody of the
three children, fifty dollars per month child support, and per-
mission to remarry before the end of the one-year waiting
period. She got custody of the children, but her husband's
argument that he was unable to earn money while in jail was a
telling one; she received neither alimony nor child support. The
divorce decree also omitted any mention of remarrige.^''
Another one percent of sampled Linn County petitioners
accused their mates of being habitual drunkards; nearly 2 per-
cent of women and 0.5 percent of men used this ground. In one
instance, a mother of three young children was divorcing her
husband for the second time. She explained that she had
remarried him because he had promised to quit drinking. But
he continued to drink heavily; he went on "sprees" and beat her.
She received a divorce and custody of the children but no child
support. In another case, a husband who stated that his wife
drank, cursed at their three daughters, and struck him received
a divorce and custody of the children.i«
Slightly less than one percent of sampled Linn County
petitioners charged adultery; 0.6 percent of women and 1.6
percent of men did so. In a 1930 case, for example, a wife
charged her husband with abandoning her and their two chil-
dren, threatening her with violence, refusing to support her
16. Cases #52681 and 53723, Record of Divorces.
17. Case #42003, Record of Divorces. In most felony cases, the crime went
unnamed. See, for example. Case #57028, Record of Divorces.
18. Cases #50739 and 52631, Record of Divorces.
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and the children, and committing adultery with a woman he
illegally "transported" from Illinois to California for "immoral
purposes." She won a divorce, custody of the children, and ten
dollars per week child support. In an especially harsh petition, a
husband charged his wife with adultery and with having been
"an inmate of a house of prostitution" during recent months. He
received custody of their three children, but the judge allowed
her visitation rights. Although it may seem curious that the
judge allowed a woman of her reported character to visit her
children, many judges believed that even errant mothers had
important bonds with their offspring.^'
In the Linn County sample, every petitioner cited specific
charges of cruelty, abuse, or desertion. Although such factors as
rising expectations of marriage or a determination to have a
companionate marriage may have contributed to the disinte-
gration of their marriages, petitioners had to frame their
charges to fall within the limits of Iowa divorce law rather than
exploring and recording the full range of reasons for requesting
a divorce.
DIVORCE-SEEKERS, of course, typically presented only one
side of the story. In most cases, there was little opportunity for
defendants to present their own complaints unless they count-
ersued. Also, petitioners were often likely to paint the worst
possible picture of their marriages and spouses in order to per-
suade a judge to grant them a divorce and award them a favor-
able settlement.
Conflicting testimony in contested divorce suits demon-
strates the folly of taking a petitioner's view of marital failure
and a spouse's sins as truth. In 1928 a woman who had been
married six times before sued her husband, who had been mar-
ried twice before, on the ground of cruelty. She testified that he
cursed at her and refused to give her money. In his cross-
petition, her husband maintained that she nagged, complained,
and wanted a home in Cedar Rapids rather than in Clinton
where he worked. He added that she cursed at him and ha-
19. Cases #41557 and 46669, Record of Divorces. For another example of a
husband charging his wife with adultery, see Case #55725, Record of
Divorces.
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rassed him to the point that it impaired his health. She got a
divorce and two hundred dollars while he paid the court costs
and attorney's fees.^ "
In another 1928 case a husband stated that his wife associ-
ated with other men much to his "humiliation and' grief." He
wanted a divorce, their house and automobile, and all house-
hold goods. His wife responded that because she had been
employed and had done all the housework as well, she was
entitled to an equal portion of their property and household
goods. She added that her husband had physically abused her,
made her so nervous that it "spoiled her peace of mind and her
appetite," cancelled her charge account, and caused her to lose
her job. On May 22, 1929, the husband received a divorce and
their property, automobile, and household goods.^ ^
In other contested cases, defendants protested charges so
effectively that they, instead of the original plaintiffs, received
divorces and favorable judgments from courts. In 1929 a
woman charged her husband with striking, abusing, and chok-
ing her. She asked for alimony and a writ of attachment against
her husband's property. He denied her allegations and charged
her with cohabiting with other men and currentiy living with
an Iowa City man. After a protracted hearing, the judge ruled
for the husband. In another case, a husband who had been
married twice before charged his wife, who had been married
once before, with calling him a "son of a bitch" and a "dirty
dog," neglecting her household duties, and threatening to strike
him with a poker. She countered that he had gone out with
other women, knocked her into a ditch, and attacked her at a
dance. The judge ruled for the
DESPITE THEIR MANY DISCREPANCIES and difficulties,
divorce records often contain information that is useful and
worthy of further study. The Linn County register, for example,
affirms the growing democratization of divorce, a process that
was occurring all over the nation.
20. Case #37932, Record of Divorces.
21. Case #39124, Record of Divorces.
22. Cases #39792 and 42022, Record of Divorces.
Divorce Records 797
According to the register, people from many ethnic and
racial groups sought divorces. Although the majority of Linn
County litigants listed their nationality as American, others
apparently failed to understand the concept because they
responded that their nationality was Yankee, Iowan, Kansan,
Missourian, Jewish, white, "redskin," or unknown. Bohemians,
who were a sizable group in Cedar Rapids, were also the domi-
nant ethnic group to request divorces in Linn County; they
accounted for approximately 5.5 percent of sampled litigants.
Germans composed slightly over 5 percent of sampled litigants,
while English and Irish numbered nearly 4 percent each. Hand-
fuls of other litigants identified themselves as African, Afro-
American, Assyrian, Belgian, Canadian, Czechoslovakian,
Danish, Dutch, French, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Lithuanian,
Mexican, Norwegian, Polish, Russian, Scotch, Serbian, Scandi-
navian, Scotch-Irish, Swedish, Swiss, Syrian, or Welsh.
Race was not always clearly recorded in the register, but it
appears that sixty-one African-American couples divorced
between 1928 and 1944. Wives obtained forty-three of these
divorces, husbands eighteen. Two interracial couples obtained
divorces. In both cases, white wives sued black husbands.
Another significant Linn County statistic is the number of
prior marriages of each litigant, which hints at the emergence of
multiple divorce in the United States. Among female litigants in
the sample, slightly less than 18 percent had been married once
before, 3.6 percent had been married twice before, and almost 1
percent had been married three times or more before. The sta-
tistics for male litigants are nearly identical. One woman and
one man admitted to six prior marriages.
It is impossible to determine whether death or divorce ter-
minated these litigants' previous marriages, but surely some
had ended in divorce. In 1938 an article in Harper's Monthly
confirmed the existence of multiple divorce. The female author,
who had recently married for a third time, analyzed her two
divorces and speculated on reasons for multiple divorce.^''
Although multiple divorces would have skewed the divorce
rate, analysts generally overlooked the phenomenon. The
23. "Thrice Married," Harper's Monthly 176 (AprU 1938), 545-53.
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history and development of multiple divorce is still largely
unstudied.
The Linn County case sample also indicates that a signifi-
cant number of marriages were extremely brief in duration.
Twelve percent of sampled divorce cases involved marriages of
less than two years duration. One woman requested a divorce
from her husband on the ground of cruelty because he had,
according to her, used violent language, threatened her life, and
impaired her health by constantly pointing out her faults. They
had married on October 25, 1932, and were divorced on
November 8, 1933. In 1939 a wife charged her husband with
cruelty because he had "damned and vilified" and struck her.
They had married on January 12, 1938, and were divorced on
September 30, 1939.2*
Yet other data from the divorce register demonstrate that
alimony and child custody awards, which lay entirely in the
hands of judges, were something of a lottery. Usually, women
received such awards far more often when they were plaintiffs.
Principles of judicial discretion and alimony awards had
undergone long development in Iowa. The Iowa Code of
1838-39 stated that in divorce cases based on a wife's adultery
"the husband shall have the personal estate for ever, and the
real estate of the wife," but a court could "allow for her subsis-
tence" out of the couple's holdings as it saw fit. If the wife was
deemed the innocent party, she received the property she
owned at the time of marriage and could expect the court to
order alimony payments up to one-half of her husband's
income. The Code of 1842-43 put additional power into the
hands of judges by ruling that courts would decide both
property matters and alimony payments. Judges were still ex-
pected to restore an innocent wife's property to her and to
grant alimony payment to wives who were innocent parties to
divorces. 2^
Subsequent legislation reaffirmed judicial discretion. The
Iowa Code of 1851 stated that the court could make decisions
regarding the "property of the parties and the maintenance of
24. Cases #45509 and 52353, Record of Divorces.
25.1839 Iowa Territorial Statutes 190; and 1839 Iowa Territorial Revised Stat-
utes 239.
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the wife as shall be right and proper." Under this rule, courts
could, and did, give a share of a husband's property to a wife as
alimony, thus allowing her more freedom to manage her own
affairs than she would have had with payments. In addition,
judges sometimes awarded even guilty wives property settle-
ments and alimony awards. The Code of 1873 further enlarged
the prerogatives of judges by providing that "the court may
order either party to pay the clerk a sum of money for the sepa-
rate support and maintenance of the adverse party and the chil-
dren, and to enable such party to prosecute or defend the
action." Because of this provision, in 1882 a husband received
alimony of three hundred dollars although he was at fault.^ ^
In the Linn County sample, only 29 percent of litigants
received alimony and 4 percent received child support in place
of alimony; 67 percent received neither alimony nor child sup-
port. In cases involving alimony awards, 87 percent of plaintiffs
were women. This finding suggests that women were still more
likely to get alimony if they were the innocent parties in divorce
actions.
In addition to data from the divorce register, individual
case files are also useful. They flesh out statistical data and
expose aspects of divorce overlooked by the register. For
instance, case files show that a number of divorced persons in
Linn County remarried in less than- one year, the waiting
period required by Iowa law. According to the documents in
seventy-seven randomly selected case files, fourteen people
expressed interest in circumventing the one-year waiting
requirement. In one instance, a wife and mother of two chil-
dren accused her husband of "consorting" with another
woman and refusing to support his family. On June 20, 1944,
she received a divorce, custody of the children, and six dollars
per week child support. Six days later, she was back in court,
claiming that her former husband had "absconded from the
state" and was not making his support payments. She asked
the court's permission to marry an employed Cedar Rapids
man who would provide a home for her and her children.
There is no evidence that the judge raised any questions about
26. Code of Iowa (1851) § 1485; Code of Iowa (1873) § 2226; Gallaher, Legal
and Political Status of Women, 69-73.
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the timing of the incidents in this case. It is likely that he was
pleased to see a new family in the making and thus gave her
permission to remarry immediately.^^
A number of other cases also suggest that many judges
were more concerned about creating new families and pro-
viding two parents for children than they were about the legal-
ities of the prescribed waiting period. A 1932 decree that gave
a father custody of the couple's two children also gave him
permission to remarry at any time although there is no evi-
dence in the records that he requested such a waiver.^ ^ In a 1942
divorce suit, the court also condoned rapid remarriage. In this
case, a wife sued her common-law husband for a divorce on the
ground of alcoholism. For an unexplained reason, the judge
ordered the couple's two children to remain in the custody of
the juvenile court until further notice. The divorce was granted
on October 5, 1942. Although neither party received permis-
sion to remarry, the wife reappeared in court on March 4,1943,
to inform the judge that she had married a defense-plant
worker from Burlington, Iowa. She also requested custody of
the two children. Again without questioning the timing of these
events, the judge remanded custody to her and her new
husband.^^
Unarguably, the Linn County divorce register and case
files for the years 1928 to 1944 provide useful data and fasci-
nating stories regarding divorce during these years. Certainly,
divorce records beckon researchers and raise significant ques-
tions that demand extensive analysis. Still, perhaps the most
important point to be derived from the Linn County records is
that such documents must be used with caution because they
only partially reveal the underside of marriage. To take them at
face value is to ignore their difficulties—and to distort conclu-
sions about such crucial matters as people's attitudes toward
marriage and their reasons for divorce.
27. Case #56132, Record of Divorces.
28. Case #44499, Record of Divorces.
29. Case #55257, Record of Divorces.

